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Abstract: This paper defends the claim that there are — at least — 
two kinds of normativity in technological practice. The first concerns 
what engineers ought to do and the second concerns normative 
statements about artifacts. The claim is controversial, since the 
standard approach to normativity, namely normative realism, actually 
denies artifacts any kind of normativity; according to the normative 
realist, normativity applies exclusively to human agents. In other 
words, normative realists hold that only “human agent normativity” 
is a genuine form of normativity.  
 
I will argue that normative realism is mistaken on this point. I will 
mainly draw on material of Daniel Dennett and Philip Pettit to show 
that it makes sense to talk about artifactual normativity.  We claim 
that this approach can also make sense of human agent normativity 
— or more specifically “engineer normativity”.  Moreover, it avoids 
some of the problems formulated by opponents of normative realism. 
Thus I will develop a strategy which: (i) makes sense of artifactual 
normativity; and (ii) makes sense of “human agent normativity”, 
specifically “engineer normativity”. 
 
KEYWORDS: Normative Realism — Response-dependence — 
Normativity — Technology — Interpretation  
1. Introduction 
In a now classic paper Hector-Neri Castañeda developed a theory of 
normativity consisting of two main categories: the category of ought to do 
and the category of ought to be 
1
. Some authors accepted this distinction, 
while offering more elegant formulations. They would, for example, rather 
                                                
1
 Castañeda, 1970. 
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talk about deontic normativity (ought to do) and evaluative normativity 
(ought to be). Others have doubted such a distinction can be made at all. 
Roughly stated, they claim that the evaluative can be reduced to the deontic. 
For instance, to say an act was right, means nothing more than that the agent 
has done what he ought to have done 
2
. 
 
At first sight, it seems the philosophy of technology could benefit from 
Castañeda’s distinction, since it seems apt to define two forms of normativity 
in technology. The category of ought to do would in that case cover 
statements about what the engineer ought to do — how he ought to design his 
artifacts, for instance. The category of ought to be, on the other hand, would 
relate to how artifacts ought to be — e.g. the dimension of a piece of A4 
paper ought to be 210mm x 297mm.  
 
To some extent I will defend and make more explicit this line of argument in 
the course of the present paper. However, I will formulate it differently. From 
now on, I will not speak about “ought to do” and “ought to be”, but about 
“human agent normativity” and “artifactual normativity”. On this account 
artifactual normativity not only comprises ought to be statements, but some 
ought to do statements as well, such as: this artifact is a watch, so it ought to 
perform its intended function, namely it ought to keep the time.   
 
The aim of this paper, then, is to answer the question: can we make sense of 
this so-called artifactual normativity? I will contend that, indeed, we can. 
 
I will proceed as follows. First, I will say something about normative realism, 
which is arguably the standard approach to normativity. I will argue that 
normative realists cannot account for artifactual normativity. They may argue 
that this is no problem at all, since there is no such thing as artifactual 
normativity. I will argue that this artifactual normativity is, on the contrary, 
essential for making sense of engineering norms.  
 
Indeed, I will go a step further. I will argue that normative realism is a poor 
candidate to account for human agent normativity as well. To do that, I will 
invoke two points of criticism, which I call the problem of autonomy and the 
problem of intentionality.  
 
In sections 4 and 5, I will develop an alternative that makes sense of 
artifactual normativity and, at the same time, makes better sense of human 
agent normativity. It will be interpretative and dispositional in nature. 
                                                
2
 Dancy, personal communication. 
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In section 6, I will programmatically deal with some ontological issues and 
suggest that my account is not anti-realist nor relativist. Finally, section 7 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
  
2. What Normative Realists Ought To Reconsider: Part I 
Clearly, I have some doubts about what normative realism as a theory might 
achieve, but let us begin with a short summary of the theory. 
 
Normative realists maintain that normativity can be explained — if it can be 
explained at all — in terms of reasons. More importantly, normative realists 
think those reasons are facts, facts which, more or less independently of our 
human make-up, provide reasons in virtue of their own nature 
3
. So, if Jesse 
has a reason not to play with guns, the normative realist would say, it is 
because what playing with guns consists in, and not because of Jesse’s 
psychological make-up, desires, and the like. Playing with guns is objectively 
wrong and this fact gives people a good reason not to play with guns. 
 
In the 1970’s, Joseph Raz first explored normativity in terms of reasons. He 
remains loyal to the basic idea: ‘The normativity of all that is normative 
consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons.’ 
4 
 
Raz characterizes a norm as follows 
5
: A norm is a fact which operates as an 
exclusionary reason. This means that a norm contains not only a first-order 
reason, stating what one ought to do, but a second-order reason as well, 
namely an exclusionary one: it excludes acting for another (competing) 
reason. Consider for instance the imperative “Obey your superior”. 
According to Raz, it derives its normativity from the fact that it provides a 
reason to obey your superior and that it implies furthermore that you ought 
not to act for any other reason; irrespective of other considerations, you ought 
to obey your superior.   
 
Following von Wright, Raz discerns four elements in any norm 
6
: (i) the 
deontic operator (the so-called ought); (ii) the norm subjects, namely the 
persons required to behave in a certain way; (iii) the norm act, namely the 
action which is required of them; and (iv) the conditions of application, 
                                                
3
 Here I follow a formulation of Lillehammer (2002 and 2003). 
4 
Raz, 1999, p. 67. 
5 
Raz, 1975 & 1990. 
6 
Ibidem, p. 50. 
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namely the circumstances in which they are required to perform the norm 
action.  
 
For my purpose, element (ii) is crucial: according to Raz norms only apply to 
human agents and their actions. Human beings might have reasons to do 
such-and-such, objects don’t. Corollary: unless Raz agrees to take a 
Dennettian interpretative stance towards artifacts — and I am confident that 
he, as a realist, would not — artifactual normativity does not fit into his 
normative realist account. I will later argue that this is a deficiency, but let us 
first show that Raz is not alone in this conclusion.  We will examine a second 
normative realist,  Jonathan Dancy, and show that he is committed to the 
same conclusion — artifactual normativity is unexplainable for the normative 
realist. Along the way, I will sketch some arguments to be used in later 
sections.  
 
Dancy’s particularism reacts to the fact that authors, such as Raz, restrict 
normativity to so-called perfect reasons, i.e. reasons which cannot be 
overruled by any other consideration 
7
. Dancy claims that such perfect 
reasons don’t exist. He defends the thesis that all reasons are pro tanto 
8
. 
Consider the norm “Obey your superior”. In some cases, it indeed excludes 
disobedience, in other cases, the norm will be weighed against other reasons; 
your superior might be drunk or may ask you to do something highly 
despicable. A pro tanto reason, then, is a reason which is, all things 
considered, the best reason to act upon.  
 
If we agree with the particularist, we can not understand the normative 
merely in terms of reasons which exclude other options — like Joseph Raz 
does. Dancy's account attempts to reconcile normative realism and 
particularism by explaining normativity in terms of “favouring”. He holds 
that normative reasons are reasons which favour certain paths of action and, 
importantly, that favouring comes in different degrees. Some facts are more 
decisive than others; some speak modestly in favour of doing X, others cry 
out loud, so to speak. Confronted with conflicting reasons, agents weigh them 
and generally select the most favouring reason for action. All things 
considered, it is the best reason at hand.  
 
                                                
7 
More accurately, Raz allows for non-perfect reasons as well. He calls them non-mandatory 
reasons. This means they are mildly exclusionary; they permit you to refrain from other 
(competing) reasons. It is however hard to see how such non-mandatory reasons differ from 
ordinary reasons. 
8 Dancy, 2004. 
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Thus, like Raz, Dancy reduces normativity to reasons for human action 
9
. 
Maintaining that a knife ought to be sharp, for example, is a non-normative 
claim, unless it favours further action, such as giving the engineer a reason to 
produce sharp knifes.   
 
I hope it’s clear that both in Raz’s and Dancy’s account there is no room for 
artifactual normativity. But why should this be a problem?   
 
First, it is widely agreed that normativity is related to certain ought 
statements. The exact nature of this relationship and whether oughts can be 
analyzed at a more primitive level remain open issues — or, better, topics for 
philosophical dispute. Saying, as normative realists do, that normativity is 
related to reasons is one thing; defining, for instance, when mere reasons turn 
into normative reasons — presumably the crux of the question: what is 
normativity? — is another. And so far — as Jonathan Dancy concedes
10
 — 
nobody has come up with a satisfying answer to this question, except by 
relying on mere intuitions. Pending settlement of this point, I think it is 
reasonable to maintain a rather liberal account of normativity and claim that 
my intuitions are different from those of the normative realist: ought 
statements about artifacts are normative. Of course, this is too easy a way out, 
so I will develop two other lines of argument. 
 
First, restricting normativity to human agent normativity seems in conflict 
with our everyday use of the term “norm”. Consider an example taken from 
the technological sciences: the Dutch Institute for Norms and Normalization. 
It is, so to speak, a gathering point for norms; norms which not only concern 
the conduct of engineers producing artifacts, but also the artifacts themselves. 
For a car to be marketable it ought to function properly and it ought to 
conform to certain standards – for instance, it ought to comply with certain 
emission standards, it ought to pass such-and-such crash tests, and the like. 
Of course, such norms might function as a motivational element in human 
behavior, for instance, in the behavior of engineers designing the artifacts 
which ought to be so-and-so. But such norms seem independently relevant in 
legislation and in cases where a user evaluates a certain artifact. In such 
cases, the primary focus of the evaluator is the artifact, not the behavior of its 
designer. The most natural way to describe norms, I suggest, is to think of 
them as idealizations of how things ought to be done or ought to be. For 
example: in order for a human agent to meet the norms of rationality, he 
ought to act so-and-so; in order for an artifact to meet the norms of 
                                                
9 
Dancy, personal communication. 
10 Dancy, personal communication. 
  
 
 
 
Technè 10:1 Fall 2006     Vaesen, How Technology Ought To Be Interpreted…/122 
 
optimality, it ought to be so-and-so, or ought to perform this-and-that. On this 
account, then, the difference between agent and artifactual normativity would 
be related to what the norms are about: in agent normativity, norms are about 
human beings and their actions, artifactual normativity on the other hand 
concerns artifacts.  
 
Of course, the normative realist could grant that in natural language we do 
indeed use normative notions when talking about artifacts; but, as a 
philosopher, (s)he has taken up the job to tidy up the sloppiness of  natural 
language. (S)he might do this by following at least two other lines of 
argument. The first is to claim that so-called artifactual norms are non-
normative, since they merely refer to expectations. Second, the normative 
realist could hold that these so-called norms are to a certain extent normative, 
but in a derivative sense: their normativity ultimately can be reduced to 
norms about actions, say, the designer ought to have taken. By giving three 
examples, I will show the problems of both strategies, and thus put the 
burden of proof on those who deny artifacts any kind of normativity.  
 
First, if artifactual norms were expressions of mere expectations, it would be 
hard to understand cases in which expectations yield evaluative judgments. 
Suppose I drop a pen. My expectation is that it will fall.  This is sometimes 
expressed as, "when I drop it, it ought to fall," but clearly the ought here is 
non-normative. It does not support evaluative judgments: if the pen somehow 
fails to fall, I wouldn’t judge it a bad pen. Nor will I call the manufacturer to 
tell him the pen was poorly designed. On the other hand, if I use it to write 
down something and see that no ink is released, my claim ‘The pen ought to 
release ink’, is not only about what I expect the pen to do, but also relates to 
what it (normatively) ought to do, given its intended function. Only when I 
have such intended function in mind, I am in a position to judge the pen to be 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, a judgment I wouldn’t make about the pen disobeying the 
laws of gravity.   
 
The example illustrates that artifactual oughts may have two sides: an 
evaluative one and one casting expectations. A second example, however, 
can show that some of those oughts are merely evaluative, and even stronger, 
that they are at odds with our expectations. Suppose you find your car, lights 
still on. They still glow, but only dimly; presumably your battery has run low. 
In this case, your judgment ‘my car ought to start’, surely doesn’t reflect what 
you expect: you reasonably believe your battery has run low, so you predict 
that your car will not start. Again, your judgment is framing what the car 
ought to do, in order for it to fulfill its functional role. You may take yourself 
responsible for the car’s malfunctioning, or shift responsibility to its 
producer: the latter has done a poor job, (s)he should have built in an 
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automatic light extinguisher.     
 
A final example should make clear why evaluative judgments about artifacts 
not always can be reduced to agent normativity. Indeed, if your new car is 
malfunctioning, you can hold its producer responsible: (s)he ought to have 
designed it so that it, say, does not explode when you turn the ignition on. 
But what if your car is malfunctioning just because it’s an old one? Because 
it is a car, there are certain functions it ought to perform: for instance, it ought 
to start when I turn the key. Since it doesn’t, it is a malfunctioning car: it’s a 
poor means of transportation. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how we could 
translate this evaluative judgment in terms of human agent normativity. Cars 
age and their components get worn-out; no designer has ever come up with 
an immortal car, so holding the car manufacturer responsible seems a bit 
forced. (S)he has done what (s)he had to do, at least within the boundaries of 
the current state of the art.   
 
Now, these arguments might not to be decisive. I just have shown the 
problems one can encounter, when one denies artifacts any kind of 
normativity. Perhaps there are other arguments that deny artifactual 
normativity and avoid these issues.  If so, I cannot find them. In the 
meantime, I think it is reasonable to take a modest, pragmatic position: our 
concept of artifactual norms has instrumental value, since it allows us to 
make better sense of engineering practice and engineering language. 
Therefore, the question whether they are genuinely normative is of minor 
importance and can be postponed until a definitive and complete account of 
normativity settles the issue. 
  
3.  What Normative Realists Ought to Reconsider: Part II 
 
Normative realism doesn’t make sense of artifactual normativity, I claimed. 
But, is its explanation of agent normativity satisfactory? I will contend it 
isn’t. I will formulate two general points of critique. They may be not 
decisive, but will justify at least why I will develop an alternative (sections 4-
6). 
 
First, recall that normative realism adheres to the thesis that agents have good 
reasons to act in some ways rather than others in virtue of the existence of an 
independent normative reality, the latter consisting of reason giving options 
11
. It claims that options themselves provide sufficient reasons merely in 
virtue of their own nature, irrespective of human make-up, desires, 
                                                
11
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rationality, and the like. In other words, the normative realist holds to a 
response-independent normative reality. To understand this view even better, 
let me contrast it with an account of response-dependence. 
 
Response-dependent theorists hold to what we might call the rational 
intelligibility condition. This condition stipulates that options provide 
normative reasons only in virtue of being responded to by rational agents. 
Agents have normative reasons to pursue desires only on the condition that 
these desires would be endorsed in rationally favourable circumstances. 
Where the normative realist maintains that options provide normative reasons 
in virtue of their intrinsic nature — say, their intrinsic goodness — the 
response-dependency theorist will claim they do so in virtue of their external 
relations to the responses of agents to those options. Thus, while the 
goodness of an option is an intrinsic property for the normative realist, the 
response-dependent theorist defines it relative to the rationality of the agent 
confronted with it.  In Michael Smith’s words, an option is a good option in 
as far as a fully rational agent would desire it 
12
. 
 
I will return to response-dependency in section 4. For now, I hope to have 
illustrated what it means to say that the normative realist holds to a response-
independent normative reality. 
 
Now, one problem of normative realism I will call the autonomy problem. It 
is related to the following 
13
. Suppose normative realists are right and that 
normative reasons indeed are to guide human action. Then, on a purely 
response-independent account it would be hard to explain the fact that finite 
human beings are able to recognize them and to respond to them. As 
Lillehammer says 
14
:  
 
If ends provide reasons in virtue of their nature, what is to stop this 
nature from being such as to outrun the best possible efforts of finite 
agents to grasp them as reason-giving in rational deliberation?  
 
If humans are in no position to recognize reasons, then reasons lose their 
normative and practical function. It would be impossible for them to guide 
us, to improve, correct and evaluate our actions. In a sense, they are too 
autonomous to perform their supposed normative tasks. 
 
                                                
12 
Smith, 2002, p. 329. 
13 
Here I rephrase an argument of Lillehammer (2002, p.50). 
14 
Lillehammer, 2003, p.4. 
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So what the rational intelligibility condition urges is that the extension of 
normative reasons be constrained by facts within the grasp of finite agents 
who reason soundly. Thus, the normative realist should make plausible that 
normativity involves at least some constraint(s) on the make-up of agents. 
Like Christine Korsgaard has argued: any realist account divorcing the 
existence of reasons from the exercise of a capacity for practical rationality 
fails to answer the normative question 
15
. 
 
Lillehammer, however, doubts that the normative realist can do so 
16
. Rather, 
he alleges that intermediate positions which claim to reconcile normative 
realism with a form of response-dependency are untenable. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to scrutinize his arguments. Besides, I think normative 
realism faces yet another problem. It is what I call the problem of 
intentionality, and I think it speaks even more in favour of abandoning 
normative realism. 
 
Defenders of normative realism often use phrasings such as: options or facts 
are normative reasons in as far they “exclude” 
17
, “favour” 
18
, “prescribe”, 
and “contribute to” certain paths of action, insofar as they “speak” to us, 
insofar as they “tell” us what to do. I find these formulations pretty odd. If 
one says that a fact favours a certain way of going on, how does this 
favouring work? By what kind of magic does the fact that “playing with guns 
is wrong” speaks to us?  
 
The point I want to make is the following: normative realists take a kind of 
Dennettian intentional stance towards facts and reasons, because they have 
to. If the clue to normativity is to be found in an independent normative 
reality, the latter actually has to do something; facts are to be interpreted as 
intentional agents who “speak” or “favour” or “prescribe.” 
19
 
 
To be clear, I have no objections to intentional stances as such although I 
doubt that normative realists share my instrumentalist tendencies. In any 
case, I think that they should be more explicit about what they exactly hope 
                                                
15
 See Korsgaard, 1995, p. 14ff. 
16 
see Lillehammer, 2003. 
17 
See my explanation of Raz’s account, section 2. 
18 
See my explanation of Dancy’s account, section 2. 
19 
And not only that, they should do it in such a way that finite human beings are able to 
receive the message. In speaking, the fact that “playing with guns is wrong” should keep, so to 
say, in the back of its mind, that its message should be recognizable to human beings. Maybe 
it’s my lack of imagination, but I do not see how facts (be it stone-facts or so-called objective 
normative facts) can do all that. 
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to explain, when they intentionalize facts and reasons. Perhaps they are 
merely talking “metaphorically”, but this metaphor should be explained since 
it has wide-ranging repercussions. For one thing, it puts their so-called 
realism in jeopardy and with it the existence of an independent normative 
reality, unless the latter consists of concepts instead of (normative) facts. 
Second, it is unclear what lies underneath their metaphorical talk. Consider 
Dancy’s favouring relation: the normative fact that “playing with guns is 
dangerous” favours Jesse’s not playing with guns. Is this favouring a causal 
relation? Dancy says no 
20
. As a non-naturalist, he believes that the normative 
does not supervene on the descriptive; he thinks there is a normative realm, 
which does not necessarily correspond to a descriptive counterpart. 
Favouring is the basic normative relation and doesn’t need further 
explanation; it just occurs. Why and how? We just don’t know. 
(Nevertheless, I want to know.) 
 
Both remarks concerning the problem of autonomy and intentionality lead me 
to the following conclusion: Normative realism is at best a theory to make 
sense of and interpret human action. It might indeed have some instrumental 
value and the concepts it offers — such as reasons, prescriptions, and the like 
— probably are used in our common-sense vocabulary and our folk morality. 
Nevertheless, I think it would be better to develop an interpretative strategy 
which has at least some underpinning in our natural world. It ought to be a 
theory which avoids what Blackburn calls a Platonic mystery, i.e., a theory 
which does not rely on ‘[normative] facts which bear only a strange 
relationship to the natural order, and whose own credentials and authority 
remain shrouded in obscurity 
21
’. To such theory we turn now.  
4. Oughts in Rational Explanations  
 
Thus far I have told a negative story. To sum up, an alternative should meet 
three criteria:  
 
(A.i)   it should explain artifactual normativity; 
 (A.ii) it should avoid the autonomy problem by taking into account 
human dispositions; 
 and 
(A.iii) if interpretative, intentional terms should somehow be backed 
up by a causal story. 
 
                                                
20 
personal communication. 
21 
Blackburn, 1998, p. 55. 
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I think a form of interpretative dispositionalism is a fair candidate. I will 
introduce the basic notions in this section, and apply them to technology in 
section 5.  
 
In general, on a dispositional or response-dependent account of an entity, say 
a value, the nature and existence of that entity is constituted by the responses 
of agents to the world in some non-trivially defined set of favourable 
circumstances 
22
. Consider again Michael Smith’s dispositional theory of 
value: an option is a good option insofar as a fully rational agent would desire 
it. This means the goodness of an option is not an intrinsic property, but is 
defined by a human response [viz. a desire] in a set of favourable 
circumstances [viz. under the condition the agent is fully rational]. 
 
Now, if we want to make sense of an agent’s behaviour, we can similarly 
refer to his distinctive psychological responses: roughly, by reference to the 
psychological states which reflect the information he has recorded and the 
inclination that moves him, in short, by reference to his beliefs and desires. 
Of course, such explanations in terms of mental states are not genuinely 
causal. Nevertheless, I take it to be uncontroversial that they are in some way 
related to a causal story, a story probably in neurophysiological terms – a 
form of causality I claimed to be lacking in normative realist accounts. In 
fact, we might say we have two kinds of explanations: a neurophysiological 
one, dwelling in the order of causality, and one in terms of the mental, 
dwelling in the order of rationality 
23
. Thus, mental states are characterized 
by their place in a rational structure. And as Simon Blackburn says:  
 
[...] “rational” here means normative: it tells us how it would make sense 
for a person to factor a belief or desire into a pre-existent matrix of 
mental states. [...] It is a matter of ‘rationalizing’ the subjects, 
hypothesizing that they believe what they ought to believe, and desire 
what they ought to desire, or at least what it makes sense for them to 
desire 
24
. 
 
This means we interpret human beings as creatures with beliefs, desires, and 
other states of mind who behave in ways that makes sense, given those states 
of mind. It must be clear that this interpretative strategy comes close to a 
form of Dennettian interpretationism.  To be more specific, when 
                                                
22 
See Lillehammer, 2003, p. 5. 
23 
Both orders are close to what Daniel Dennett calls the physical and the intentional. See 
Dennett, 1987. 
24 
Blackburn, 1998, p. 53-54, italics added. 
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approaching other intentional systems, we take a Dennettian Intentional 
Stance (IS): 
 
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is 
to be predicted as a rational agent [i.e. you put a rationality assumption in 
place, K.V.]; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, 
given its place in the world and its purposes. Then you figure out what 
desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you 
predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its 
beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and 
desires will in many — but not all — instances yield a decision about 
what the agent ought to do. 
25
 
 
Moreover, like Blackburn, Dennett discerns between causal and rational 
explanations. First, causal explanations are the outcome of taking the 
Physical Stance (PS). PS is an explanatory strategy which appeals to the 
physics of the explanandum — a particle, an object, an organism. Rational 
explanations, on the other hand, are the product of an IS. The latter is 
normative, since you explain, under the assumption of rationality, what a 
certain intentional system ought to do — as suggested by Dennett’s quote 
above.  Or, following Pettit 
26
, we can characterize it by a hypothetical 
imperative:  
 
(B)  if an agent is to count as a rational being, given his beliefs 
and desires, he ought to act so-and-so. 
 
First, note that this formulation is close to my suggestion (section 2) that 
norms are idealizations, putting comparative constraints on how things ought 
to be done or how they ought to be. Second, I think we already have met 
constraints (A.ii) and (A.iii). Recall that (A.ii) stated that we are in need of a 
theory which takes human dispositions into account, in order to avoid the so-
called autonomy problem. The goodness of an action — the thing an agent 
ought to do — is, on our account, dependent on responses [viz. beliefs, 
desires] in a set of favourable circumstance [viz. under the condition is the 
agent is rational]. Moreover, (A.iii) is met as well. Our strategy is 
interpretative and the entities we pose have a causal counterpart. To 
understand this, we can refer again to Dennett. His PS and IS are not entirely 
unrelated. Intentional systems to be explained by taking an IS, are just a 
subset of all materially existing entities. And again, beliefs and desires as 
                                                
25 
See Dennett, 1987, p. 17, italics added. 
26 
See Pettit, 2002, p. 283. 
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used in IS, can to a certain extent be explained in physical terms, that is, by 
taken a PS towards them. Of course, I keep the PS/IS relationship rather 
vague, since a thorough analysis is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
With this in mind, there remain two things to be done. First we need to make 
sense of (A.i) and we need to apply (A.i)-(A.iii) to technology. This is the 
subject of next section. 
 
5.   Norms in Technology: Explaining Human Agent and Artifactual 
Oughts 
Let’s start with human agent normativity. The hypothetical imperative (B) 
can be rephrased as follows: in explaining the actions of an agent, we put in 
place an assumption that, absent malfunction and other disturbing factors, the 
agent satisfies the role of a rational agent: he is more or less rational in its 
responses to evidence and more or less rational in moving from what he 
believes and from his values values to what to do 
27
. Given an antecedent 
state, the agent ought to do X, on pain of being irrational; or, if he is to fulfill 
his role as a rational agent, he ought to respond according to the norms of 
rationality. With the aforementioned assumption in place, we are in a position 
to explain what the agent ought to do. Without it we would fail to explain, 
interpret or understand human behaviour.  
 
Now, to explain the actions an engineer ought to perform, we first have to 
add that people satisfy the role of rational creatures as a result of natural 
selection and of cultural influence 
28
. What it is for an engineer to be rational 
presumably differs from, say, scientific rationality, since both forms of 
rationality have evolved in different cultural niches. For instance, it might be 
rational for an engineer to act upon false beliefs, say as a heuristic to gain 
time; if a scientist would do the same, we usually would call him irrational. 
Rationality is a multi-faceted notion which co-varies with the conditions of 
its application, and this, in turn, has repercussions on our interpretations. It is 
reasonable to suppose that, when I interpret the actions of an engineer, I put a 
different rationality assumption in place, for instance, than when I interpret 
the actions of a scientist.   
 
An obvious challenge to this approach is that I haven’t said anything about 
what this engineering rationality consists in. I might seem to have shifted the 
                                                
27 
See Cherniak, 1986 and Pettit, 2002. 
28 
See Dennett, 1995, p. 506 and Pettit, 2002, p. 185. 
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normative question to a question of rationality. Nonetheless, I hope to have 
shed light on these issues.  For one thing, I have suggested where to look for 
an answer and, as important, where not to look: in the realm of normative 
realism. Second, the purpose of the present paper was to overcome some 
problems of normative realism; it goes without saying that further research 
needs to flesh out the rationality assumption I use. In future work, I will offer 
an account of engineering rationality by altering Dennett’s Stance Theory, 
which consists of three stances: the earlier mentioned PS and IS, and the 
Design Stance (DS). This last is an interpretative strategy to explain the 
behavior of designed entities, both biological and artificial
29
. I will introduce 
projective correlates to these stances. Engineers, I argue, do not interpret 
actual artifacts (as in DS) or actual users (as in IS), but try to predict the 
behavior of artifacts which do not exist yet and of possible users.  
 
The remainder of this section, now, will concentrate on one problem I 
promised to solve: how to understand artifactual normativity. As for agent 
normativity, I will do this by means of interpretative strategies. 
 
Let’s start with an example 
30
. Suppose we have designed a computer to add 
numbers presented to it and to display the sum: we have designed it to 
function as an adding device. The computer is a designed entity, so Dennett’s 
DS applies. Thus, we ignore the details of the physical constitution of the 
object, assume that it has been designed with a certain purpose in mind, and 
explain its behavior accordingly. Instead of working under the assumption of 
rationality (as in IS) however, we put an optimality assumption
31
 in place: the 
artifact was designed so that it actually can perform its intended function. So, 
if our design is successful, whenever we present the computer with a set of 
numbers, it will respond by giving us their sum. 
 
As in the case of human action, the sort of regularity involved in the 
computer’s responses has the status of a norm. To understand this, we can 
invoke a hypothetical imperative again (cfr. (B)): if the machine we 
developed is to count as an adder, for input seven and four, it ought to 
produce output eleven. Or, under the assumption that the system is an adder, 
we can say that it ought to output the sum of the inputs, where the ought is a 
normative ought. In this case the norm refers to the ideal state in which the 
                                                
29
 For Dennett biological objects indeed can be considered as designed entities. Interpreting 
them means we take a kind of intentional stance towards ‘Mother Nature’, as he calls the 
process of natural selection.  
30 
The example is taken from Pettit, 2002. 
31
 In our example such optimality assumption is in fact an effectiveness assumption. For sake 
of clarity we however stick to Dennett’s original terminology. 
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artifact functions properly. In light of this optimality standard, we interpret 
and evaluate its functioning. 
 
Artifactual normativity, however, is not restricted to the artifact’s capacity to 
perform its intended function. Take, for instance, the statement: “a car ought 
to be safe and clean.” We can explain its normativity, again by invoking a 
hypothetical imperative: for a car to be marketable, it ought to be so-and-so; 
it ought to be safe, it ought to be clean, it ought to comply to certain technical 
standards and the like. 
 
To sum up, I hope to have shown with sections 4 and 5, that, contra 
normative realism, it makes sense to talk about artifactual normativity; 
moreover, I think my account is better suited than its normative realist 
counterpart, when it concerns the explanation of “engineer normativity”.  
 
Before concluding (section 7), I will take up some ontological issues with 
respect to my proposal.  
 
6. Ontology And Objectivity Are Not Endangered Species 
This section sketches briefly my ontological commitments. In particular it 
concerns two questions: (i) does my approach to normativity refer to anything 
at all?; and (ii) does it exclude the objectivity of norms? 
 
The answer to the first question is: I hope so, but my account doesn’t stand or 
fall with it. The approach I have defended is in both cases [i.e. human agent 
and artifactual normativity] explanatory in nature. It offers an interpretative 
strategy, without much of an ontological commitment — maybe apart from 
the fact that our explanations almost certainly depend on lower-level, causal 
explanations. In any case, we are interested primarily in the instrumental 
value of normative theories to the neglect of realist concerns and we believe 
that our account helps make sense of engineering normativity. I won’t 
illustrate this contention for the case of “human agent normativity” — I think, 
for instance, Dennett has sufficiently done so — but focus on artifactual 
normativity instead. 
 
One benefit of my approach is the following. We can learn that a certain 
system is designed or selected to fit a certain role and we can determine its 
normative regularities, without having to know the regularities of its lower-
level causal structure. Knowing the designer or his purposes, or just a little 
empirical evidence of the system itself, may convince us that this system, say, 
is a device meant to add. And with this in mind, we are in a position to 
predict its behavior, absent malfunctioning. Second, such explanations have 
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evaluative value. If a certain system is to count as an adder, it ought to be 
designed in a way that it gives the correct sum when presented with a set of 
numbers. If it doesn’t fulfill this role, it is a bad adder or a malfunctioning 
one. Third, noticing some regularities in a system might direct us in finding 
answers to the causal story or history which has brought them about. We 
might analyze whether and how these regularities were programmed for. 
Stated differently, the higher-level interpretation of a system’s behavior may 
be of guidance to study its lower-level counterparts. 
 
Now, turning to the second question, I do think my account holds to a certain 
objectivity of norms. In the case of human agents we work under rationality 
assumptions, in the case of artifacts we invoke optimality assumptions. Both 
“rationality” and “optimality” are crucial to our normative claims, that is, 
they constrain what we reasonably can expect persons and things to do or to 
be like. For instance, suppose I interpret a person. What he ought to do is not 
merely dependent on his individual beliefs and desires, but also on what he as 
a rational being, given his mental states, is supposed to do. As such, the 
notion of rationality can be used to define better or worse ways of responding 
to a certain situation. Not any response will do. Whether this is sufficient to 
be called “genuine” objectivity, I do not know. At least it is not the 
objectivity, normative realists are after: a set of platonic norms mysteriously 
trying to persuade us to do this-and-that. 
 
1. Conclusion 
To give more structure to the story I have told, I will sum up its main 
contentions. With this paper I hope to have demonstrated that: 
 1. Normative realism offers at best an interpretative strategy to 
understand normativity. On one hand this seems incompatible with 
its realist ambitions. On the other hand, as an interpretative strategy 
it falls short in two respects: (i) as presented by Raz and Dancy it 
fails to account for artifactual normativity; and (ii) it lacks a 
supporting causal story for human agent normativity.  
2.  If one is to explain the normativity in technology, one has to embrace 
a kind of dispositional interpretationism. What an engineer ought to 
do is explained in terms of his responses [viz. his desires and beliefs] 
under the assumption that he is rational; he ought to do X, on pain of 
being irrational. What an artifact ought to do is explained in terms of 
its responses under the assumption that it purports to fulfill its 
artifactual role; it ought to perform Y, on pain of failing to be a well-
functioning artifact of type Z. A similar strategy applies when we  
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interpret the non-functional normative constraints on artifacts, for  
instance when we make claims about how an artifact ought to be like. 
3. The challenge to this account is to analyze more thoroughly the 
rationality assumption in the case of engineering actions. 
Nevertheless, I briefly argued how we could proceed from here on.  
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